Financing channels and mechanisms

Common humanitarian funds (CHF)

Common humanitarian funds (CHFs) are country-level pooled funds managed by OCHA under the overall authority of the country’s humanitarian coordinator (HC). They are usually larger than emergency response funds (ERFs), and do not set a maximum limit on grant size. Apart from in Somalia, where OCHA is the administrator, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the administrative agent and financial manager.

As part of the process of UN humanitarian reform, begun in 2005, CHFs were set up to provide strategic funding to humanitarian needs identified through the consolidated appeals process (CAP). Therefore, to be eligible for CHF funding, projects must either be included in the country’s Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) or contribute to its objectives.

The first two CHFs were established in 2006 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan. Following the initial success of these funds the smaller emergency response funds (ERFs) in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Somalia were converted to a CHF in 2008 and 2010 respectively. Following the independence of South Sudan the CHF that existed for the Republic of Sudan has been split into two separate funds.

CHFs allocate grants in two ways:

• through standard allocations to projects in the CHAP two or three times a year
• through rapid response grants to respond to unforeseen emergencies; in Sudan and the DRC 10% of the fund is kept aside as an emergency reserve, however in Somalia and the CAR the reserve accounts for 20% of the fund.

CHFs finance UN agencies as well as national and international NGOs. UN agencies often implement CHF-funded projects through NGOs so the latter also receive indirect funding from CHFs, although it is very difficult to track the amounts. In 2010 UN agencies received 58.3% of total CHF funding with NGOs receiving 41.7% in direct funding.

Prior to the split the fund in Sudan was the largest of the four, receiving a total of US$741.5 million in donor contributions between 2006 and 2010. The smallest fund was in CAR, which on average received US$7.1 million a year between 2008 and 2010. There are currently 14 DAC government donors that contribute unearmarked funding to the CHFs. In 2011 the fund in DRC received the largest amount of donor contributions at US$112.9 million.

For a donor, the advantages of funding CHFs are that:

• they support the consolidated appeals process (CAP) by providing strategic funding for humanitarian needs identified by the process
  they help to ensure timely funding to projects included in a country’s common humanitarian action plan and address unmet needs, in accordance with the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)
• they can support local capacity by funding national NGOs, though UNDP’s administrative requirements are onerous
• they reduce the administrative burden associated with bilateral funding.

The disadvantages of funding CHFs are that:

• while UNDP monitors NGO projects closely, there is no independent monitoring of UN agency projects
• disbursement from the Funds can be slow.

Emergency response funds (ERF)

Emergency response funds (ERFs) are country-level pooled funds. Their main aim is to provide rapid and flexible funding to in-country actors to address unforeseen humanitarian needs. The first ever ERF was established in Angola in 1997. When the United Nations (UN) humanitarian reform process started in 2005, the focus on pooled funding mechanisms for channelling humanitarian assistance resulted in the establishment of several new ERFs in countries that were subject to complex humanitarian emergencies. There are currently 15 ERFs in operation.

For those donors that do not have a presence in the country, ERFs can provide a convenient channel for funding. In 2010, in response to the January earthquake, the fund in Haiti received the largest amount ever to be received by an ERF – US$82 million. The majority of this funding came from non-traditional donors, with Saudi Arabia contributing US$50 million.

ERFs aim to be responsive to local country contexts, so while some only fund NGOs, others fund both UN agencies and NGOs. Their focus is on emergency response and, occasionally, emergency preparedness, so they provide funding for up to six months and do not tend to finance longer-term humanitarian needs. ERFs set limits on the size of grants; these vary between each fund and range from US$100,000-700,000. This means that projects are relatively small and normally more suited to NGOs than UN agencies.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) manages the ERF in-country both financially and programmatically. Each ERF has a Review Board consisting of the UN agency and, sometimes, NGO representatives to undertake technical reviews of project proposals and ensure that activities are coordinated with other programmes in a particular sector. Project applications recommended by the Review Board must be approved by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).

For a donor, the advantages of funding ERFs are that:

• they fund small-scale projects without the administrative burden of bilateral funding, but with the assurance of OCHA’s reporting and oversight procedures for NGO funding
• they provide non-traditional donors without field presence or in-depth country knowledge with a convenient channel for their funding
• they can strengthen local capacity by funding local NGOs directly
• they allow decision-making to be transferred to the front line of the crisis
• they help to strengthen OCHA’s coordination function in-country because funding provides an incentive for coordination.

The disadvantages of funding ERFs are that:

• disbursement of money from the fund can sometimes be slow
• OCHA must abide by administrative rules that can sometimes make it difficult for small local NGOs to access funds.

There are currently 15 ERFs in operation:

• Afghanistan
• Colombia
• Ethiopia
• Haiti
• Indonesia
• Iraq
• Kenya
• Myanmar
• Nepal
• Pakistan
• Palestine/OPT
• South Sudan (part of Sudan CHF)
• Uganda
• Yemen
• Zimbabwe

For further information see the ERF profile.

Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)

The need to improve funding for humanitarian crises on a global scale, especially through the use of pooled funding, was a driving force behind the UN humanitarian reform process that began formally in 2005. As a result, the Central Emergency Revolving Fund, which had US$50 million available to provide UN agencies with loans, evolved into the present day Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) with a substantial grant-making capacity as well as the original loan element. There are currently discussions underway around reducing the loan amount to US$30 million as recommended by the recent five-year evaluation[1].

The CERF provides donor governments and the private sector with the opportunity to pool their financing on a global level to enable the delivery of timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to those affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts. Donor contributions are unearmarked. Since its inception in 2006, the CERF has received total contributions of US$2.5 billion and a further US$326 million in pledges from more than 150 government and non-government donors, together with a great number of individual contributions from private citizens.

When a disaster strikes the CERF provides rapid funding, but it also spends money in countries where it has identified an underfunded crisis. These decisions are based on needs assessments, the percentage of needs met and consultations with agencies and humanitarian coordinators. In this way the CERF aims to provide more equitable funding. Of the total US$2.3 billion spent since 2006, US$740.1 million or 32.3% has gone to underfunded emergencies.

The CERF is managed by a dedicated Secretariat within OCHA New York. Currently, only UN agencies (with the exception of OCHA) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are eligible to receive CERF funding. NGOs, which implement the bulk of humanitarian assistance, receive CERF funding only as implementing partners of UN agencies. The CERF Secretariat has made considerable efforts to ensure accountability of CERF funds for donors, focusing on the consolidated reports on CERF funding that the UN agencies provide through the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator. However, it is reliant on UN agency internal reporting and monitoring and evaluation procedures.

Each year in December the CERF holds a donor conference. During this conference the Secretariat provides an overview of the progress of the fund and asks donors to announce their pledges for the coming year. This is often only an indication of what money is likely to be received as it relies on budgetary decisions which are yet to be made by some donors.

For a donor, the advantages of funding through the CERF are that:

• it provides equitable funding response to disasters – the CERF underfunded window contributes to reducing funding discrepancies across major emergencies
• it can enable donors to respond quickly to a disaster – the CERF Secretariat can disburse funds within days which is often faster than a donor’s bilateral procedures
• it enables donors to implement the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD): reduce donor earmarking, foster coordination, support strategic funding allocations based on need
• it reduces the administrative burden associated with bilateral funding.

The disadvantages of funding the CERF are that:

• there is limited independent monitoring and evaluation, so the CERF Secretariat is heavily reliant on UN agency reporting, which can be of variable quality
• the Fund is UN-centric as it is coordinated and managed by the UN with limited involvement of other actors; this means that there is potential for conflicts of interest,
• there is no direct funding to NGOs even though NGOs implement most UN programmes; this can slow down response, particularly when UN agency sub-contracting procedures are not suitable for emergency situations.

For further information see the CERF profile.

[1]CERF five-year evaluation: ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/110811%20CERF%20Evaluation%20Report%20v5.4%20Final.pdf

Disaster Emergency Relief Fund (DREF)

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) set up the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) in 1985 to ensure that immediate financial support is available for Red Cross/Red Crescent emergency response to disasters.

When a disaster occurs, national Red Cross/Red Crescent societies can apply to the DREF for funding to support an immediate response. The funding can take various forms:

• start-up loans in the case of large-scale disasters (when donors are likely to provide funding that can be used to pay back the loan)
• grants to meet the cost of responding to small-scale emergency relief operations (when funding from donors is unlikely to be forthcoming)
• funding for making preparations in the case of imminent disaster.

All requests for DREF allocations are reviewed on a case-by-case basis. The IFRC can authorise and release money within 24 hours so the DREF can support genuine emergency response.

The IFRC issues an annual appeal for funding to the DREF so that it has funds available when disasters strike. In 2011, IFRC requested CHF16,857,403 and received CHF16,007,266 in contributions (just over 95% of the requested amount). Contributions come from government donors, Red Cross/Red Crescent societies in donor countries, companies and private individuals.

The DREF responds to a range of different types of disasters:

• natural disasters such as floods, cyclones and earthquakes
• epidemics (such as outbreaks of meningitis)
• population movements (such as the displacement that occurred when the Nigerian Government formally handed over the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroonian authorities on 14 August, 2008)
• man-made disasters (such as a plane crash in Lebanon in 2010).

For a donor, the advantages of funding the DREF are:

• its ability to respond to small-scale disasters; donors do not usually have the administrative capacity to respond to these
• its ability to respond within 24 hours, which supports genuine disaster response
• the IFRC’s network of national societies, which enables it to respond in places where other humanitarian actors may not be present or have the capacity to respond
• the potential to invest in disaster preparedness.

For a donor, the disadvantage of funding the DREF is that:

• IFRC encourages unearmarked contributions, which reduces a donor’s ability to select which disasters to respond to.

Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies’ (CBHA) Emergency Response Fund (ERF)

The Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies’ (CBHA) was established in 2010 by 15 UK based NGOs to strengthen the coordination and capacity of the humanitarian NGO sector. Part of its original DFID funded remit was to establish an emergency response fund (ERF) to enable quicker and more effective emergency responses to populations affected by disasters. The ERF provided immediate seed money for agencies to begin relief efforts before other funding became available. Ordinary emergency fundraising can sometimes take days or weeks to be collected and disbursed and in some instances can delay action. This delay can cost unnecessary suffering. Programmes funded by the ERF must begin delivering aid within seven days of the start of a response and completed within 30 days. Since March 2010 the ERF has allocated UK£4 million to 12 humanitarian emergencies[1]. After a successful pilot, the CBHA agencies have committed to taking the fund to global scale.

The ERF functions as follows:

• decisions about utilising the ERF are made on a crisis-by-crisis basis
• once the ERF is triggered by at least one of the members, the Consortium Board calls a teleconference within 12 hours
  decisions about funding are based on available information including scale and impact of the disaster, the needs of the population and the coping capacity of the local government and local structures
• interested members must submit their applications within 24 hours of the emergency being declared
• CBHA agencies have agreed that the ERF will support the members with the most appropriate capacity to respond to the particular crisis
• the ERF sub-committee makes transparent decisions in the spirit of peer review within 24 hours after applications have been received
• reports of implementing members are peer-reviewed by monitoring and evaluation experts
  past ERF grants have only supported interventions of no more than 30 days in duration

For donors, the advantages of funding the CBHA’s ERF are that:

• it enables principled humanitarian action (in line with GHD principles) through a peer-review & needs based approach
• it enables response to low profile and first phase slow onset crises as well as rapid onset emergencies
  it enables donors to fund NGOs with delivery capacity, and particularly those already with presence on the ground, to respond quickly (earlier and faster) to an emergency
• it provides access to a global NGO network that includes over 2450 local NGOs in 140 countries, as members can respond through sister or partner agencies
• it enables donors to strengthen local response capacity (approximately half of all past grants went to local NGOs)
• it reduces the transaction burden of financing NGOs (in particular lower than UN-managed pooled funding mechanisms)
• it incentivises HQ and on-the-ground coordination
• it is still under development, and supporting donors will be able to influence the future structures

For donors, the disadvantage of funding the CBHA’s ERF is that:

• loss of some level of control; it is a global civil society fund so CBHA members rather than donors decide which crises merit a response, as well as which partners will implement the response
• only members of the CBHA can apply
• the fund is still young (since 2010) and evolving

[2] The ERF peer review mechanism was used to disburse an additional £21 million in the context of the Pakistan 2010 floods.

International non-governmental organisations (INGOs)

The number of INGOs involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance has grown hugely since the early 1990s. For example, in response to the Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010 it was estimated that there were at least 400 NGOs taking part in the response the response [Source: ICVA page 4 www.icva.ch/doc00004599.pdf]. They play a significant role, mobilising considerable resources from the general public and delivering the bulk of humanitarian aid. It is estimated that NGOs have raised over US$15.6 billion in private contributions between 2006 and 2010. Moreover, some big NGOs have control over larger budgets than those of many government donors. Despite this, INGOs have been facing a decrease in direct government funding. The problem for many donors is that they no longer have the administrative capacity to manage multiple small grants to NGOs – they need to be able to write large cheques. This has resulted in experiments with funding INGO consortia, such as the Joint Initiative in Zimbabwe and the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA), which channels the Department for International Department’s (DFID) funding to a consortium of UK NGOs. (See: Konyndyk, J. (2009) Developing NGO-led approaches to pooled funding: experiences from Zimbabwe, Humanitarian Exchange Number 42, pp. 28-31, London, Humanitarian Practice Network. Available online: www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2993)

For a donor, the advantages of funding INGOs are as follows:

• they can usually deliver assistance quickly and directly to affected communities
• they usually have links with affected communities, often through local partners
• they have lower administrative costs than UN agencies, enabling more of the funding to be spent on assistance
• they provide detailed reporting on the use of donor government funding.

The disadvantages of funding INGOs are as follows:

• donors tend to require greater administrative capacity to manage INGO grants because the amounts of funding tend to be smaller and accountability requirements are greater than those for UN agencies; however, multiannual funding agreements can help to partially solve this problem
• some INGOs are particularly protective of their independence, particularly in conflict-affected countries, making them more likely to operate outside recipient country government channels than would UN agencies.

National non-governmental organisations (NGOs)

National and local NGOs in recipient countries have always struggled to access international funding (unless sub-contracted by international NGOs and UN agencies). Donor governments tend not to fund them directly either due to accountability concerns or because they lack the necessary administrative capacity. In some cases, such as European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Office (ECHO), donors have legal restrictions on funding national NGOs. However, country-level pooled funds – the emergency response funds (ERFs) and common humanitarian funds (CHFs) – present an opportunity for national and local NGOs to access the funding they need to develop a delivery capacity. The amounts of funding that they receive are still relatively small and, sometimes, even these country-level funds set rules that exclude national NGOs or make it harder for them to access funding.

For a donor, the advantages of funding national and local NGOs include:

• having direct links with affected communities
• supporting local organisations to build local capacities that will remain in country long after the disaster
• having very low operating costs
• working knowledge of local society and culture, including vulnerabilities
• easier access to affected populations in insecure environments.

The disadvantages of funding national and local NGOs include:

• they tend to have very limited capacity; those with humanitarian response capacity tend to be overwhelmed with work from INGOs and UN agencies
• donors need to have mechanisms in place to manage local-level contracts and for oversight of these organisations, as they are less likely to have internationally recognised standards of accounting and reporting in place (though those receiving funding from ERFs and CHFs are required to provide detailed accounts and undergo audits).

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement comprises the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), established in 1863, and 186 national societies that are members of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). On average, the ICRC relies on government donors for 98% of its funding, although it also receives contributions from national societies. The IFRC, on the other hand, receives over 75% of its income from national societies, who raise funds both from the general public and from governments. Private voluntary contributions represent a considerable share of the IFRC’s and Red Cross national societies’ income.

For example, the British Red Cross National Society receives substantial funding from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), but in 2010 it received over half of its budget (53%) from private donors, including individuals, foundations and corporations. In addition to that, a third of the income proceeded from income-generating activities such as the sale of promotional items, first aid training, gaming and lottery and income from investments. Consequently, a mere 14% of the British Red Cross income in 2010 came from governments and institutional donors.

The ICRC has a special mandate and role in humanitarian assistance, derived from the Geneva Conventions, with an obligation placed on it to assist populations affected by war and internal conflict. It places great emphasis on adherence to the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, independence and humanity. Despite its principled stance, the ICRC has been affected by the perceived loss of neutrality of humanitarian actors. This has meant that its staff and offices are no longer sacrosanct and it has suffered from a number of high profile attacks (e.g. in Chechnya, Iraq, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo).

For donors, the advantages of financing the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement include the following:

• it has unparalleled reach through its national societies and this means that it is often able to deliver assistance quickly and in areas inaccessible to other agencies
• its principled stance can help in gaining access to affected populations in conflict-affected areas, which in particular is the mandate of the ICRC
• by working with and through national societies the Movement supports local disaster response capacity
• the IFRC’s Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) enables it to provide immediate and up-front funding for disaster response.

Reasons why a donor may decide not to fund the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement include the following:

• national societies play an auxiliary role to governments, so in some cases this may create a conflict with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement
• the Movement is very good at implementing specific projects such as non food items (NFI) distribution or tracing, hence the same projects are usually implemented; if different projects are required e.g. nutrition projects, donors may look elsewhere.

For further information see the GHA article on funding through the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and a case study on the Kenyan Red Cross.

Affected governments

It has not been easy for the international community to ensure an appropriate role for affected-state governments in humanitarian response. One challenge is the often limited capacity of the governments, which has made it difficult for them to consolidate those capacities and ensure that they are not undermined. Humanitarian aid also largely bypasses affected-state structures because aid agencies have been focused upon the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence rather than trying to find ways of establishing principled engagement with state structures. [Source: Harvey, P. (2009) Towards Good Humanitarian Government: The role of the affected state in disaster response, HPG Report 28, London, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute.]

Whilst ensuring an appropriate role for affected states in natural disasters is not easy, it is far more challenging to engage them in responding to conflict and post-conflict situations. In such cases, governments may be non-existent, weak, illegitimate and/or one of the warring parties. When governments are party to a conflict, humanitarian agencies limit their engagement in order to protect their humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence.

In the post-conflict period, the focus on peace-building and state-building means that donors and aid agencies have to make political choices about engagement, yet humanitarian assistance needs to continue alongside these more political forms of assistance. Therefore, the key challenge for donors is to find the right aid modalities that can support the state but are not dependent on its capacities to ensure that aid is delivered effectively.

For a donor, the advantages of funding affected-state governments are that:

• this empowers affected-state structures and supports local capacities, in line with the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)
• it may help the government to play a stronger role in coordinating the relief effort
• it transfers responsibility to those that understand local contexts and cultures.

The disadvantages of funding affected-state structures are that:

• they usually have limited capacity and this tends to delay their response
• in situations of conflict, they may be very weak, illegitimate and/or party to the conflict.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)

United Nations General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. It began operations on 1 May 1950 and provides assistance, protection and advocacy for around 4.8 million registered Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the occupied Palestinian Territory (Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem). In the absence of a solution to the Palestine refugee problem, the General Assembly has repeatedly renewed UNRWA’s mandate, most recently extending it until 30 June 2014. (See www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=18) Total contributions to UNRWA in 2010 dropped from US$1.0 billion in 2009 to US$840.1 million. (See www.unrwa.org/userfiles/file/financial_updates/2010/Total%20Contributions%20to%20UNRWA%202010%20-%20All%20Donors.pdf). The peak in contributions in 2010 was prompted by the humanitarian operation in response to the Israeli military attack – known as Operation Cast Lead – on Gaza. (See www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=85)

UNRWA helps Palestine refugees to:

• acquire knowledge and skills
• lead long and healthy lives
• achieve decent standards of living
• enjoy human rights to the fullest possible extent.

UNRWA’s programmes are organised under the following headings:

• education
• health
• relief and social services (basic food supplies and cash subsidies, as well as emergency cash grants and adequate shelter to the most vulnerable refugees)
• microfinance
• infrastructure and camp improvement (to improve the physical and social environment of UNRWA refugee camps)
• emergency programmes (to mitigate the effects of emergencies on refugees’ lives).

Unlike other UN agencies that work through local authorities or implementing partners, UNRWA provides services directly to Palestine refugees, though it cooperates closely with governmental authorities when providing services such as education and healthcare (as these are services normally provided by the public sector, and some government bodies in its areas of operation also provide some services to Palestine refugees). UNRWA plans and carries out its own activities and projects, and builds and administers facilities such as schools and clinics. It operates or sponsors over 900 installations with nearly 30,000 staff across the areas in which works.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established on December 14, 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly. The agency is mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. Its primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and wellbeing of refugees. (See: www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbf.html)

UNHCR’s main activities can be divided into the categories below.

• Protection: Ensuring that refugees can enjoy their basic human rights in their countries of asylum or habitual residence and that they will not be forced to return to a country where they could face persecution.
• Assistance: This ranges from emergency assistance (clean water and sanitation, healthcare, shelter materials and other relief items) to refugee registration, assistance and advice on asylum applications, education and counselling. UNHCR also assists people who return home by arranging transport and giving returnees assistance packages. The agency is also involved in local integration or reintegration programmes, including income generation projects, restoration of infrastructure and other assistance.
• Durable solutions: UNCHR’s ultimate goal is to help find durable solutions that will allow refugees to rebuild their lives in dignity and peace. There are three options open to refugees where UNHCR can help: voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement to a third country in situations where it is impossible for a person to go back home or remain in the host country.

In 2010, UNHCR estimated that there were around 15.4 million refugees globally and around 27.5 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) – see www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.html. UNHCR´s original mandate did not include IDPs but, since the number of IDPs has far outgrown the number of refugees, it has responsibility to assist IDPs in conflict situations. By the end of 2009, UNHCR estimated that it was helping 14.7 million IDPs – see www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html.

UNHCR is not mandated to assist people displaced by natural disasters, other than in exceptional circumstances for example the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the earthquake in 2005 and floods in 2010 in Pakistan, and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008. Under the Cluster Approach, UNHCR has the lead role in coordination and management of camps, protection, as well as the provision of emergency shelter. However, since it cannot generally assist IDPs in natural disasters, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is the cluster lead for camp coordination and camp management for IDPs affected by natural disasters and the IFRC is the cluster lead for the provision of emergency shelter.

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), set up in December 1946 to provide food, clothing and healthcare to children in Europe suffering from the effects of World War II, became a permanent part of the UN in 1953. In 1989, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which UNICEF upholds. (See www.unicef.org/about/who/index_history.html.)

UNICEF has a network of National Committees in 36 countries, each established as an independent local non-governmental organisation. These National Committees raise funds from the private sector, promote children’s rights and secure worldwide visibility for children threatened by poverty, disasters, armed conflict, abuse and exploitation. Around one third of UNICEF’s annual income comes from the National Committees,1 which amounted to US$900 million between 2007 and 2010. (See www.unicef.org/about/structure/index_natcoms.html.)

Although UNICEF started out as an organisation providing emergency assistance, its development work has grown and income for emergency work represents about one quarter of UNICEF’s total income. However, UNICEF’s commitment to humanitarian assistance is reflected in its Core Commitments for Children (CCCs) in Humanitarian Action. These outline critical priority actions in six programme areas: Health, Nutrition, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), Child Protection, HIV and AIDS and Education. This is reflected in the fact that UNICEF is the global cluster lead for education, nutrition, child protection and water, sanitation and hygiene.

Although there has been some criticism of the implementation of the Cluster Approach, a number of studies have found good practice examples amongst UNICEF-led clusters. (Steets, J., F. Grunewald et al (2010) Cluster Approach Evaluation 2 Synthesis Report. Groupe Urgence, Réhabilitation, Développement and Global Public Policy Institute. Available from: www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-products-common&tempid=99.)

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was founded in October 1945 with a mandate to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, to improve agricultural productivity, and to better the condition of rural populations. (See: www.fao.org/unfao/whatitis.htm.) It also has the objective of contributing to the growth of the world economy. Overall, FAO aims to achieve food security for all, i.e. to make sure people have regular access to enough high-quality food to lead active, healthy lives. (See: www.fao.org/about/mission-gov/en/.)

FAO’s planned budget for the 2011-2012 biennium is US$2.4 billion. Of this, 45% is financed through assessed contributions from member states while the rest is covered by voluntary contributions from members and partner organisations. See www.fao.org/about/strategic-planning/en/

In 2008, FAO embarked upon a comprehensive programme of organisational reform. This has involved restructuring the headquarters and delegating decision making to create a more responsive structure and to reduce costs. It is also modernising and streamlining administrative and operational processes. The organisation argues that improved internal teamwork and closer external partnerships coupled with an upgrading of Information Technology infrastructure and greater autonomy of FAO’s decentralised offices allows the organisation to respond quickly where needs are greatest. (See www.fao.org/about/mission-gov/en/)

Despite these reforms, FAO has limited capacity for emergency response. Its field offices still have limited delegated authority, which restricts the maximum size of contracts with NGOs (in Kenya, the amount was increased from $50,000 to $100,000 in 2010). This makes it difficult for FAO to provide large-scale emergency response through NGOs, as it must sign small-scale agreements with several organisations. Its contractual procedures can also be time-consuming because all NGO proposals must undergo a technical review. To overcome the limitations of derogated authority at field level, FAO undertakes procurement for implementing organisations and covers some other costs directly. This can cause delays, particularly as FAO has to source internationally because its rules preclude local purchase. These procurement rules can also damage local markets. (Information in this paragraph is drawn from: Mowjee, T. (2010) Independent Review of the Value-Added of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in Kenya. Development Initiatives, www.devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/resource-docs/CERF-Kenya-Review-Final-Report-100710.pdf.)

FAO’s focus on agriculture in humanitarian response means that timeliness in its receipt of funding is extremely important, if it is to be able to distribute seeds and tools in time for planting seasons. If delays are caused due to the late arrival of funds or programme inputs, it may have to wait until the next season, by which time humanitarian needs may have changed. This has sometimes made it difficult for FAO to use CERF rapid response funds, which must be committed within three months with activities completed within six months. (This paragraph is based on: Mowjee, T. (2010) Independent Review of the Value-Added of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in Kenya. Development Initiatives, www.devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/resource-docs/CERF-Kenya-Review-Final-Report-100710.pdf)

World Food Programme (WFP)

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), established in 1961, is primarily a humanitarian agency spending – on average, in the last decade, 86% of its funding was humanitarian. In fact, WFP is the largest humanitarian agency and in 2009 its spending represented 27% (US$4.0 billion) of the estimated global humanitarian assistance of US$15.1 billion. In 2010 WFP’s budget was US$3.8 billion.

It focuses specifically on providing food and addressing hunger. Its objectives are to:

• save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies
• prepare for emergencies
• restore and rebuild lives after emergencies
• reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition everywhere
• strengthen the capacity of countries to reduce hunger.

(See: www.wfp.org/about.)

WFP distributes in-kind food aid that it receives (mainly from the United States (US), which provides about 50% of food aid)2 and also buys food with cash contributions. In 2009, WFP distributed 2 million metric tons (MT) of in-kind food aid and purchased a further 2.6 million MT with cash contributions.3 (See: Harvey, P., Proudlock, K., Clay, E., Riley, B., and Jaspars, S. (2010) Food aid and food assistance in emergency and transitional contexts: A review of current thinking. Humanitarian Policy Group Synthesis Paper, Overseas Development Institute. Available from: http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/4934.pdf; and www.wfp.org/wfp-numbers.)

In recent years, there has been considerable debate about the effectiveness of in-kind food aid, particularly in the case of the US, which “ties” its food aid. Tied food aid is grown and processed in the US and shipped on US flagged ships in order to benefit US farmers, grain processors and shipping firms. (See: See Clapp, J. (2007) The (New) Politics of Food Aid: Identifying the Need to Move towards a Cash-based International Food Aid System. Queen’s International Observer, Jan-Feb 2007, pp. 7-11 for a clear explanation of tied food aid, the problems with it and why it persists.) According to an FAO report, in 2006, as a result of tied food aid, around US$600 million or one third of the global food aid budget was spent in donor countries rather than benefiting beneficiaries. (See: FAO (2006) The State of Food and Agriculture: Food aid for food security? Food and Agriculture Organization. Available from: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/a0800e/a0800e.pdf.)

A study commissioned by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also found that the cost of providing tied food aid was, on average, 50%. (See: Clay, E. and Riley, B. (2005) The Development Effectiveness of Food Aid: Does tying matter? Organisation for Economic Co-operation And Development (OECD). Available from: www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2250.pdf.)

Food aid can also disrupt local markets and undermine the resilience of local food systems, which is why it became one of the most contentious issues in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 2006-2007. As a result, the DAC report concluded that there is near-consensus that financial aid is more effective than in-kind food aid. Therefore, donors should only rely on food aid rather than financial aid if there is a context-specific reason for doing so (for example, if local procurement is not a feasible option). In early 2012 the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) revised its policy so that it no longer has to “buy America” and that companies in developing countries can be granted contracts from USAID. (See: www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/feb/06/usaid-changes-procurement-policy?intcmp=122 and www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-01-10/html/2011-33240.htm.)

Cash contributions give WFP greater flexibility about where and what to purchase so that it can secure the best prices and ensure that food items are culturally appropriate. However, there is a growing view that WFP should shift towards providing cash grants or implementing cash-for-work projects rather than buying and distributing food aid.

United Nations (UN)

The United Nations (UN) system is multilateral in that nation states come together to participate in its governance, finance and operation. Within the UN system, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs or Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) has headed the humanitarian architecture since 1991. Baroness Amos is the current ERC and chairs two bodies that coordinate humanitarian activities – the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA).

Several organisations within the UN system provide humanitarian aid, usually specialising in a sector or beneficiary group. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and World Food Programme (WFP) provide the largest amounts of humanitarian aid, although the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) also provide humanitarian aid. In 2010, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP and WHO had a combined humanitarian budget of $7.1 billion. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) does not deliver humanitarian aid but is a key actor, being the UN organisation established to coordinate international humanitarian aid efforts.

UN agencies deliver humanitarian assistance mainly through non-governmental organisations (NGOs), both international and local, though they also often work through or in direct partnership with recipient country governments.

For donors, the advantages of channelling funding through UN agencies are as follows:

• they can absorb large amounts of funding
• they can provide assistance on a large scale, for example through national programmes
• as cluster leads, they can ensure that assistance is coordinated
• they work with recipient country governments
• they have both global reach and country level expertise.

The disadvantages associated with channelling funds through UN agencies are as follows:

• they may be slow to deliver as they deliver largely through other organisations and their contractual procedures can take time
• as larger organisations they tend to have higher administrative costs than NGOs
• UN agencies provide standardised global reports that make it more difficult for individual (particularly smaller) donors to track their funding.

Military

Most countries have a long history of deploying their national military assets in a domestic context to assist fellow citizens in the response to natural disasters. Two significant examples are the Pakistani military in the response to the 2005 earthquake and the China People’s Liberation Army in the response to the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake.

There is also a lengthy history of countries deploying their militaries to assist with the response to disasters in other countries. Nineteen countries contributed military contingents in support of the Pakistan Army in the response to the 2005 earthquake. (See: Cosgrave, J. and Herson, M. (2008) Perceptions of crisis and response: A synthesis of evaluations of the response to the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, ALNAP Seventh Review of Humanitarian Action London, Overseas Development Institute.) Within two days of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami the United States (US) had mobilised a task force of 16,000 military personnel, two dozen ships, more than 100 aircraft, six maritime prepositioning ships and specialist P3 Orion aircraft for search and reconnaissance missions. (Kent, R. and Ratcliffe, J. (2008) Responding to Catastrophes: US Innovation in a Vulnerable World: A report of the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Press.) Such assets represent a substantial addition to the resources and assets deployed by humanitarian organisations, which could never possess such capacities, logistical or otherwise. However, these assets are extremely expensive so their use is usually restricted to very large-scale disasters.

In the last decade, military functions in conflict situations have expanded to incorporate a range of tasks related to humanitarian goals, including support for humanitarian and rehabilitation efforts and the protection of civilians, which has been contentious, with intervention in Libya the most recent example. Militaries, including United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces, are keen to implement ‘quick impact’ projects to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of local populations, making their peacekeeping role or military presence more acceptable. (See: Wheeler, V. and Harmer, A. (2006) Resetting the rules of engagement: Trends and issues in military–humanitarian relations, HPG Policy Brief 21, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute.) In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi troops have undertaken activities as diverse as trucking water to local hospitals and running art classes for children. While these activities may be helpful, they may not be well coordinated with the humanitarian programmes of aid agencies and not always reflect the priorities for funding. Because a troop contingent is only posted to a country for six months and does not have time to understand the local context, there is a risk that activities will be inappropriate. The UN does appoint Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) officers to integrated missions in order to minimise the potentially negative impact of the military’s relief activities.

The blurring of lines between military action and the provision of aid is perhaps greatest in Afghanistan and Iraq, where aid donors are actually involved in conflict and with the setting up of mixed military and civilian Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). It remains to be seen whether the concept will be extended beyond these two countries, but humanitarian agencies continue to be very worried about the implications for humanitarian space and principles. One reason for this concern is that the mixing of military and civilian personnel and objectives makes it more difficult for aid agencies to be seen to be upholding humanitarian principles. The perceived loss of neutrality could be one of the causes of the increased incidence of attacks against aid agencies.

In 1994 the UN agreed a set of guidelines, revised in 2006, to regulate the conditions and modes of engagement for military humanitarian action. The ‘Oslo Guidelines’ on the use of military and civil defence assets in disaster relief were developed primarily to guide UN organisations, including UN peacekeeping forces, and while a number of governments participated in their development they are in fact non-binding for governments.

In 2008, the UN and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) developed guidelines on civil-military relationships that apply beyond the UN, e.g. the use of military escorts. The aim of these guidelines is to promote respect for international law, standards and principles by outlining those that are relevant in complex emergencies.

Crucially, the Oslo Guidelines state that military involvement should be used as a last resort, when no comparable civilian alternative exists, and only when meeting a critical humanitarian need. The Oslo Guidelines envisage conditions under which UN civilian agencies will coordinate, with the affected state, requests and deployments of military humanitarian activities.

The principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) commit donors to supporting the implementation of such guidelines but, in reality, they will be implemented effectively only when both military and humanitarian actors have a better understanding of their respective roles, comparative advantage and ways of working.

For a donor, the advantages of providing assistance through its military are as follows:

• the military has assets that other actors do not, which can be vital for providing assistance in a natural disaster
• the standing of the military with the local population can be improved, with the military seen as not only a combat force but also one that can do good, such as providing aid or undertaking reconstruction projects.
• This can bring a higher (and different) public profile in the countries providing soldiers, negating to an extent the perception that the military are only involved in combat operations.

The disadvantages of providing assistance through the military are as follows:

• the deployment of military assets can be very expensive
• without training around humanitarian issues and a clear understanding of the local context, the military may risk doing more harm than good
• the blurring of lines between military action and humanitarian aid in conflict situations can undermine local populations’ perceptions of the neutrality of aid agencies and put the latter at risk.

Civil defence

During World War II and the Cold War, civil defence meant civilian volunteers preparing to protect citizens in the face of military or nuclear attack. Since the end of the Cold War, the concept has evolved to focus mainly on disasters, whether natural or man-made. Within the European Union (EU), the term has been replaced by civil protection. The EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism aims to facilitate cooperation (such as pooling of resources) and coordination between Member States, particularly when they are responding to a major emergency (such as the Japan tsunami in March 2011).In the United Kingdom (UK), the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 governs civil defence. These various terms for civil defence encompass prevention, preparedness and response activities.

In the humanitarian context, the concept of civil defence is enshrined in International Humanitarian Law, where it is defined according to various tasks rather than referring to the organisations that carry them out. Civil defence activities are listed as follows (See www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/conduct-hostilities/civil-defence/overview-civil-defence.htm):

• warning
• evacuation
• management of shelters
• management of blackout measures
• rescue
• medical services – including first aid – and religious assistance
• fire-fighting
• detection and marking of danger areas
• decontamination and similar protective measures
• provision of emergency accommodation and supplies
• emergency assistance in the restoration and maintenance of order in distressed areas
• emergency repair of indispensable public utilities
• emergency disposal of the dead
• assistance in the preservation of objects essential for survival
• complementary activities needed to carry out any of the tasks mentioned above.

For a donor, the advantages of using civil defence capacities are that:

• staff have specialist skills, i.e. relating to search and rescue
• such staff can be deployed quickly as they are trained and prepared to respond to emergencies
• they can raise the profile of the donor country.

The disadvantage of using civil defence capacities is that:

• efforts need to be coordinated with those of other countries, to avoid the risk of duplication and teams hampering each other’s work.

Technical assistance

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides a definition of the costs and activities that can be termed as technical cooperation and reported to the DAC as such. Broadly speaking, this incorporates a contribution to development in the form of know-how, expertise, consultancy, education and training (including personnel, training, research and associated costs). See: ECD DAC glossary of statistical terms stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2686

The DAC distinguishes between freestanding technical cooperation and investment-related technical cooperation. The former comprises activities to support the level of knowledge, skills, technical know-how or productive aptitudes of the population of developing countries. Examples include providing human resources (teachers, volunteers and experts) and activities building human resources, such as education, training and advice. The latter comprises support for the design and/or implementation of projects that will increase the physical capital stock of the recipient country. Services can include consulting services, technical support, the provision of know-how linked to the execution of an investment project, and the contribution of the donor’s own personnel to the actual implementation of the project (managers, technicians, skilled labour and so on). In DAC statistics, spending on investment-related technical cooperation is reported as project and programme aid.

Donors usually provide technical assistance or cooperation for development activities rather than humanitarian aid. This is probably because the emphasis is on life-saving activities rather than developing longer-term capacities. However, some donors second staff members to United Nations (UN) agencies to boost their capacity for humanitarian response or disaster preparedness. Donors have also made technical expertise and training available to build the disaster management and response capacity of governments facing recurring natural disasters. One example is the Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR), which is training Indonesian scientists, amongst other activities. (See www.aifdr.org/aifdr_public_website/.)

For donors, the advantage of providing technical assistance is that:

• it can boost humanitarian response and preparedness capacity, particularly of local structures.

The disadvantages of providing technical assistance include:

• a risk of the assistance not being relevant or not building on existing capacity, and being simply an imposition of external experts
• a risk of losing the training or expertise due to staff turnover
• a questionable value for money.